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As  I  have  recently  detailed,  American  Pastoral  revolves  around  a  perspectival  
dance   in  which  Nathan  Zuckerman   in   tango-­‐‑like   fashion   leads  his  partner,  
the  Swede,  so  as  to  enhance  his  (narrative)  performance  [MASIERO  2011].  The  
tango  metaphor  is  intended  to  transpose  to  the  narrative  situation  the  well-­‐‑
known  fact  that  the  better  the  male  dancer,  the  less  visible  his  performance  
and  the  more  outstanding  his  partner’s.  Starting  from  the  moment  in  which  
during  the  high-­‐‑school  reunion  Zuckerman  learns  from  the  Swede’s  brother  
Jerry   about   the   “bomb   [that]   detonated   his   life,”   Zuckerman’s   mind   is  
caught   in   a  writerly   trap   he  will   begin   to   respond   to   by   immersing   in   his  
hero’s  perspective  [ROTH  1997  :  69].  Narratologically  speaking,  this  amounts  
to   saying   that   the   narrative   situation   slides   toward   figuralization:   we   are  
mimetically  shown  into  the  Swede’s  interiority  while  he  is  obsessively  trying  
to  come   to   terms  with   the  unpredictable  which  has  burst  his   life  open  and  
left  it  raw.  On  that  earlier  occasion,  I  focused  my  attention  on  the  interplay  
between   Zuckerman’s   authorial   perspective   and   the   Swede’s   restricted,  
internal  one.  I  proposed  that  Zuckerman’s  “overt  intrusions  take  the  atypical  
shape   of   consonant   reinforcements   of   the   Swede’s   own   take   on   things,”  
presenting   an   exemplary   instance   of   what   Dorrit   Cohn   dubbed   “stylistic  
contagion”  according  to  which  the   linguistic  markers  conveying  the  figural  
character’s   “style”   infect—so   to   speak—the   narrator’s   own   vocabulary  
[MASIERO   2011  :   186;   COHN   1978  :   33].   The   result   of   this   contagion   is   the  
reduction  of  the  distance  between  Zuckerman’s  authorial  perception  and  the  
Swede’s  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  intensification  of  the  reader’s  involvement  
in  the  Swede’s  existential  predicament  on  the  other.    
For   the   sake   of   concision,   I   will   take   for   granted   the   details   of   this  
narratological  structure  revolving  around  the  blurring  of   the  boundaries  of  
the   two   perceptual   selves   at  work   in  American   Pastoral—Zuckerman’s   and  
the   Swede’s—and   propose   a   possible   direction   to   delve   deeper   into   the  
dynamics  of   the   reader’s   entanglement   in   the  protagonist’s  plight,  with   an  
eye  on  Zuckerman’s  own  involvement.    
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As   the   direction   of   my   argument   will   lead   me   to   consider   the   mirroring  
between  the  reader’s  involvement  and  Zuckerman’s,  it  is  paramount  that  we  
begin   from   the   quote   I   deem   foundational   as   far   as   the   vocabulary   of   a  
figural  situation  is  concerned:  
But   to   wish   oneself   into   another’s   glory,   as   boy   or   as   man,   is   an  
impossibility,   untenable   on   psychological   grounds   if   you   are   not   a  
writer,  and  on  aesthetic  grounds   if  you  are.  To  embrace  your  hero   in  
his   destruction,   however—to   let   your   hero’s   life   occur   within   you  
when  everything  is  trying  to  diminish  him,  to  imagine  yourself  into  his  
bad   luck,   to   implicate   yourself   […]   in   the   bewilderment   of   his   tragic  
fall—well,  that’s  worth  thinking  about.  [ROTH  1997  :  88]    
The  verbs  employed  by  Zuckerman  to  describe  the  kind  of  work  he  does  as  a  
writer   are   notable   for   their   emotional   import:   both   on   the  physical   level—  
“embrace”—and   on   the   cognitive   level—“occur   within,”   “imagine,”  
“implicate”—the  writer   conveys   his  willingness   to   adjust   to   the   existential  
frequency  of  his  hero’s  tragic  fall  explicitly.  As  the  repetition  of  the  reflexive  
pronouns  indicates,  these  verbs  involve  the  writer’s  self  directly:  Zuckerman  
is  as  much  at   the  center  of  his  aesthetic  endeavor  as  his  hero.  The  writer   is  
here  describing  a  metaphorical  embrace  symbolizing  the  complete  sharing  of  
the  same  plunge  into  an  obsessive,  unrelenting,  claustrophobic  self-­‐‑probing.  
American  Pastoral  is  the  story  of  two  internal  dialogues,  Zuckerman’s  and  the  
Swede’s,  as  they  have  both  been  “admitted  into  a  mystery  more  bewildering  
[…]  than  Merry’s  stuttering”  [93].  The  writer  tries  to  understand  the  Swede’s  
existential  mystery   in   his   own  way,   namely,   imagining  what   it  must   have  
felt   like   to   be   a  man   of   “unequivocal   success”  who   has   generated   a   “little  
murderer  […]  the  monster  Merry”  [67].  On  one  level,  American  Pastoral  is  the  
result   of   empathy,   or   rather,   of   Zuckerman’s   empathetic   calibration   of   his  
imaginative   faculties   on   the   Swede’s   existential   predicament.   On   another  
level,   American   Pastoral   is   the   reader’s   own   empathetic   adjustment   to  
(Zuckerman’s  version  of)  the  Swede’s  plight.  One  way  or  another,  the  book  
may  be  said  to  tell  the  story  of  a  mesmerizing  entrancement.  
These   considerations,   which   are,   to   knowledgeable   readers   of   Roth’s  
masterpiece,  rather  obvious,  take  on  a  new  light  once  we  consider  the  recent  
work   of   Vittorio   Gallese,   a   neurophysiologist   who   teaches   human  
physiology   at   the   University   of   Parma.   His   work   in   the   field   of  
neurosciences   has   led   him   to   be   one   of   the   discoverers   of  mirror   neurons:  
using  Functional  Magnetic  Resonance  Imaging  first  in  monkeys  and  then  in  
humans,   Gallese   and   his   team   have   demonstrated   that   sensory-­‐‑motor  
neurons   set   in   motion   by   a   given   activity   are   triggered   by   the   mere  
observation   of   that   same   activity   perpetrated   by   someone   else   as   well.  
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Further   studies   have   shown   that   this   vicarious   activation   holds   true   even  
when   the  action  can  be  only   inferred  as   it   is  actually  hidden   from  view,   in  
other  words,  when  the  action  can  be  imagined.  These  initial  results  and  the  
fruitful   cross-­‐‑fertilization  with   insights   coming   from  psychoanalytic   theory  
and  clinical  practice  have  led  Gallese  and  his  team  to  propose  “an  enlarged  
account   of   empathy”:   mirror   neurons   are,   accordingly,   considered   as   the  
neural   basis   of   emotional   sharing   and,  more   generally,   of   intersubjectivity  
[GALLESE   2006  :   48].   This   is   what   Gallese   says   about   the   neural   basis   of  
emotional  sharing:    
When  I  see   the   facial  expression  of  someone  else,  and  this  perception  
leads  me  to  experience  that  expression  as  a  particular  affective  state,  I  
do  not  accomplish  this  type  of  understanding  through  an  argument  by  
analogy.  The  other’s  emotion  is  constituted,  experienced  and  therefore  
directly  understood  by  means  of  an  embodied  simulation  producing  a  
shared  body  state.  It  is  the  activation  of  a  neural  mechanism  shared  by  
the   observer   and   the   observed   to   enable   direct   experiential  
understanding.  [GALLESE  2006  :  50,  emphasis  in  original]    
As   I   have   already   pointed   out,   for   mirror   neurons   to   be   activated   in   the  
correspondent   cerebral   area,   a  given  activity  does  not  need   to  be  observed  
but  may  be  just  inferred;  this  crucial  specification  opens  up  the  possibility  to  
consider  Gallese’s  findings  as  bearing  not  only  on  the  fruition  of  visual  arts  
but  also  upon  reading  which  revolves  around  the  imaginative  conjuring  up  
of   scenes,   characters,   events—in   a   word,   of   storyworlds.   Given   this  
necessary   specification,   let  us   return   to   the  quote  we  have   just   read  before  
moving  on   to  what   this  may   tell  us   about   the   entrancing  quality  of  Roth’s  
masterpiece.  
The   understanding   of   someone   else’s   emotions   depends   upon   “a   shared  
body  state”  which  is  the  result  of  an  “embodied  simulation.”  This  amounts  
to   saying   that   we   can   penetrate   the   world   of   the   other   when   we  
experientially   simulate   what   it   feels   like   to   be   in   a   certain   (emotional)  
situation.    
The  internal  reconstruction  activated  in  the  observer  (be  it  actual  or  virtual)  
revolves  around   the   creation  of   a   shared  world,  what  Gallese   calls   a   “‘we-­‐‑
centric’  space”  in  which  intentional  tuning  becomes  possible  according  to  an  
embodied  “as  if”  [53].  It  is  worth  stressing  the  fact  that  what  Gallese  is  here  
proposing  is  not  standard  simulation,  that  is,  “the  result  of  a  deliberate  and  
conscious  cognitive  effort  aimed  at  interpreting  the  intentions  hidden  in  the  
overt   behavior   of   others,”   but   rather   a   “mandatory,   nonconscious   and  
prereflexive   mechanism”   [GALLESE,   EAGLE   &   MIGONE   2007  :   143].   The  
process   of   “understanding”   is   grafted   on   embodied   “constitution”   and  
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“experiencing”—these   are   the   three   highly   significant   terms   Gallese  
employs.  
The   discoveries   concerning   mirror-­‐‑neurons   certainly   provide   neuro-­‐‑
scientific   evidence   for   insights   as   old   as   Plato   and  Aristotle   and  discussed  
profusely  by,  among  others,  Hume   in  his  work  A  Treatise   of  Human  Nature  
(1740).  As  Suzanne  Keen  has  aptly  put   it:   “contemporary  neuroscience  has  
brought  us  much  closer  to  […]  the  mechanisms  underlying  empathy”  [KEEN  
2006  :  207].  And  yet,  in  spite  of  this  neuro-­‐‑scientific  insight,  we  are  rather  far  
from   understanding   whether   there   is   an   interconnection   between   specific  
narrative   techniques  and  empathetic  activation.  Significantly,  Keen’s  article  
on  narrative  empathy  ends  with  a  host  of  unanswered  questions  and  exhorts  
scholars   not   to   favor   any   technique   as   intrinsically   empathetic   [224-­‐‑225].  
Empathy   is   probably   the   result   of   more   than   one   narratological   choice  
chorally   contributing   to   an   overall   (empathetic)   triggering.   I   would  
nonetheless   suggest   that   the   somewhat   synergic   effect   that   different  
techniques   contribute   to   create   does   not   exclude   the   desirability   of  
deepening  our  understanding  of  single  linguistic  choices.  I  am  confident  that  
the   comprehension   of   the   workings   of   a   single   narrative   component   may  
enhance   the   overall   awareness   of   the   functioning   of   empathetic   responses.  
More   specifically,   I   would   like   to   capitalize   on   the   pivotal   notion   of  
embodiment   as   the   concept   which  might   provide   a   unified   framework   to  
access   and   explain   both   empathetic   attunement   and   narrative   immersion  
and  understanding.    
If,   on   the   one   hand,   Nathan   Zuckerman’s   description   of   his   spending  
months   trying   to   “inhabit   this  person   least   like   [himself]”   [ROTH  1997  :   74]  
would   seem   to   describe   an   instance   of   standard   simulation—the   writer  
demonstrates  a  “deliberate  and  conscious  cognitive  effort”  [GALLESE,  EAGLE  
&  MIGONE  2007  :  143]  to  “think  about  the  Swede  for  six,  eight,  sometimes  ten  
hours  at  a  stretch,”  on  the  other  hand,  the  heavy  physicality  of  the  terms  he  
employs—“disappear   into   him,”   “exchange   my   solitude   for   his,”   “inhabit  
this  person”  [ROTH  1997  :  74]—indicates  that  the  writer  knows  well  the  basic  
functioning   of   empathetic   immersion,   namely,   experientially   sharing   a  
situation   so   as   to   be   able   to   come   as   close   as  possible   to  understanding   it.  
The   verb   “to   inhabit”   goes   very   close   to   the   notion   of   “embodied  
simulation”:   the   writer   lets   his   “hero’s   life   occur   within   [himself],”  
“imagine[s]   [himself]   in   his   bad   luck,”   and   “implicate[s]   [himself]   in   the  
bewilderment  of  his  tragic  fall”:  the  writer’s  affective  response  is  predicated  
upon  activities  eliciting  self-­‐‑other  overlap  [88].  As  is  explicitly  recounted  in  
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the   book,1   the   result   of   the   months   spent   in   the   Swede’s   shoes   is   a  
manuscript   which   we   might   assume   to   be   American   Pastoral   authored   by  
Nathan  Zuckerman2:  this  is  the  thought  Roth  wants  us  to  entertain.  Precisely  
because   of   its   revolving   around   an   imaginative   immersion,   the   fictional  
storyworld  of  American  Pastoral  becomes  a  very  interesting  and  appropriate  
case  study  to  address  that  very  notion.  
The   side   of   the   narrative   coin   concerning   the   writer’s   writing   about   the  
Swede  is  what  the  reader  gets  at  the  beginning  of  American  Pastoral  up  to  the  
dance   with   Joy   Helpern   during   the   high-­‐‑school   reunion,   then   the   plunge  
into   the  Swede’s   (imagined)  perspective   follows:   the   third-­‐‑person  pronoun  
which  signals  Zuckerman’s   lifting  the  Swede  onto  his  stage  and  his  coping  
with  the  occurrence  of  the  most  unexpected.  The  plunge,  obviously  enough,  
is   both  Zuckerman’s   and   the   reader’s:   but  how  does   the  writer—and   I   am  
here   referring   to  Roth  via  his   alter-­‐‑ego  Zuckerman—manage   to   trigger   the  
same  claustrophobic  involvement  in  the  reader?    
Michael   Toolan   may   help   us   to   set   the   stage   for   a   consideration   of   this  
question.   In   his   seminal   work   on   narrative   progression   in   short   fiction,  
Toolan  addresses   issues  concerning  the  relationship  between  narratological  
choices   and   empathetic   engagement.   Using   a   software   called  Wmatrix,   he  
charts   lexical   and   semantic   patterns   to   measure   what   he   dubs   HEI   (high  
emotional   intensity)   in   the   attempt   “to   pinpoint   the   ‘grammar’   of   highly  
emotive-­‐‑immersive   narrative   passages”   [TOOLAN   2012   :   213].  Here   is  what  
he  writes   about   the   core   situation   that   (according   to   him)  does   the   trick—
that  is,  enables  readers  to  experience  what  characters  experience:     
The  kind  of  situation  in  which  the  reader  seems  most  likely  to  develop  
an   emotional   engagement,   I   postulate,   is   one   where   a   speaker   or  
focalized  character  is  presented  (or  can  be  inferred  to  be  present)   in  a  
particularized   imaginable   situation   (a   “deictic”   task   for   the   writer)  
where   in   addition  we   readers   learn   explicitly   or   implicitly  what   they  
feel   strongly  about  and  are  moved  by   (in   the  narrative  present).  This  
engagement   is  a  drawing  of   the  reader   into  empathy  with  a  depicted  
character,   achieved   by   furnishing   the   textual   means   with   which   the  
reader   can   “see   into”   or   see   along   with   that   character’s   imagined  
consciousness.  [213,  emphasis  in  original]  
American  Pastoral  would  seem  to  be  a  perfect  example  of  the  kind  of  situation  
                                                
1   “After   I’d   already   written   about   his   brother   […]   just   before   I   set   about   to   alter  
names   and   disguise   the   most   glaring   marks   of   identification,   I   had   the   amateur’s  
impulse  to  send  Jerry  a  copy  of  the  manuscript  to  ask  what  he  thought”  [74].  
2   For   some   reflections   on   the   books  written   by  Zuckerman   in   his  whole   career   see  
MASIERO  2011b  :  208-­‐‑212.  
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Toolan  speaks  of.    
The   wording   I   would   like   to   focus   my   attention   on   is   “a   particularized  
imaginable  situation”  and  the  ensuing  parenthetical  specification  “a  ‘deictic’  
task   for   the  writer.”  To  be   imaginable,   that   is   to   say,   to   trigger   the  kind  of  
embodied   participative   involvement   that   is   the   fertile   ground   for  
understanding,  for  seeing  along  with,  a  situation  has  to  be  particularized.  I  
would   argue   that   the   power   American   Pastoral   exercises   on   its   readers  
derives   from   an   unrelenting   anchoring   to   a   very   specific   particularized  
situation   defined,   contained   and   condensed   in   a   strategic   employment   of  
deixis.    
Deictics   “are   linguistic   expressions   whose   prototypical   function   is   to  
contribute   to   acts   of   definite   reference”   (HANKS   2005  :   99).   Reference   is  
possible  because  of  the  presence  of  temporal  and  spatial  adverbials  (“now,”  
“yesterday,”   “ago”   etc;   “here,”   “there”)   and   personal   pronouns   and  
demonstratives   (“I,”   “he,”   “this,”   “that”)   that   help   the   reader   “to   relate  
utterances   to   the   spatio-­‐‑temporal   co-­‐‑ordinates   […]   of   the   act   of   utterance”  
(LYONS  1977  :  636).  As   its  Greek  etymology  suggests   (from  the  verb   for  “to  
show”),   a   deictic   spells   out   and   thus   directs   our   attention   to   the   defined,  
embodied  perspective  through  which  events  and  emotions  are  presented.  It  
has  actually  been   suggested   that   the  deictic   center—the  place   in  which   the  
narrative   “who,”   “where,”   and   “when”   originate—is   “the   reader’s  
contribution  to  understanding  the  narrative”  [RAPAPORT  et  al.  1989  :  3].  More  
about  this  later.  
Literally   ubiquitous   and   for   this   very   reason   the   most   invisible   and  
unobtrusive   of   words,   deictics,   originating   as   they   do   from   a   defined  
(perceptual)  center,  are  the  first  items  one  is  invited  to  focus  his  attention  on  
to  decide   on   issues   concerning   focalization.  According   to  Toolan’s   take   on  
the  readers’   involvement,   they  seem  to  be   the  perfect  place   to  start  as   they  
are  the  most  obvious  textual  means  with  which  readers  can  “see  along  with”  
fictional  characters.  
The  quotes  I  turn  to  now  show  what  happens  in  American  Pastoral  and,  more  
specifically,   in   the   internally   focalized  chapters,  after  Zuckerman  sheds   the  
first   person  pronoun   and   lifts   the   Swede  onto   the   stage,   as   far   as  deixis   is  
concerned:  
Was  he  supposed  to  feel  that  way?  It  happened  before  he  could  think.  
She  was  only  eleven.  Momentarily  it  was  frightening.  This  was  nothing  
he   had   ever   worried   about   for   a   second,   this   was   a   taboo   that   you  
didn’t   even   think   of   as   a   taboo,   something   you   are   prohibited   from  
doing   that   felt   absolutely   natural   not   to   do,   you   just   proceed  
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effortlessly—and   then,   however   momentary,   this.   [ROTH   1997  :   91,  
emphasis  in  original]  
I  begin  with  a  quote  from  the  very  first  pages  of  Zuckerman’s  dive  into  the  
Swede’s   perspective—that   is,   the   first   scene   he   conjures   up   to   map   the  
Swede’s   obsessive   search   “for   the   origins   of   their   suffering”:   father   and  
eleven-­‐‑year-­‐‑old  Merry  spend  a  summer  day  at  their  seaside  cottage  in  Deal  
New   Jersey   and   the   Swede   kisses   his   daughter’s   stammering   mouth   [92].  
The   episode   is   exemplary   as   it   inaugurates   the  ways   in  which  Zuckerman  
intends   to   represent   his   hero’s   consciousness:   narratorial   commentaries  
(quoted   monologue   and/or   thought-­‐‑report)   and   Free   Indirect   Discourse  
(hereafter  FID)  dance  on  the  fictional  stage  and  the  reader  is  presented  with  
stifling  close-­‐‑ups—when  FID  gets  center  stage—and  more  sweeping,  almost  
universal   considerations   about   thoughts,   emotions   and   feelings—when   the  
narrator  contemplates  the  Swede’s  situation  against  the  backdrop  of  broader  
considerations  concerning  the  individual’s  relationship  with  history  and  the  
senselessness   of   human   fate.   This   as   far   as   a   narratological   explanation   of  
what   happens   is   concerned.   I   would,   however,   pursue   a   less   theoretical  
direction  and  address  the  employment  of  deixis  taking  the  ordinary  reader’s  
point   of   view.   Bluntly   put,   the   common   reader   is   unlikely   to   know   the  
notion  of  FID  at  all;  an  attentive  one,  however,  in  spite  of  his  possible  lack  of  
an  appropriate  vocabulary,  certainly  perceives  that  there  is  a  shift,  a  change  
in   emotional   gear   which   both   allows   and   invites   one   to   tune   in   on   the  
Swede’s  predicament.    
In  her  interesting  work  on  the  readers’  caring  about  literary  characters,  Blake  
Vermeule  maintains   that   narratives   slide   into   free   indirect   discourse  when  
“emotionally   labile   material”   is   touched   [VERMEULE   2010  :   78].   I   would  
broaden   this   notion   by   calling   this   sliding   “emotional   spilling”   and   argue  
that   the  consequent  affective  response   is  particularly  contagious  because  of  
the  proximity  deictics  offer.  Through   the   reinstatement3  of  deictic  elements  
typical  of  direct  discourse,  FID  passages  become  the  vehicle  through  which  
readers   are   offered   embodied   positions   to   inhabit.   The   demonstrative  
“this”—as  opposed  to  “that”—is  more  readily  imaginable  because  it  pertains  
to  the  (same)  place  the  reader  inhabits,  or  to  put  it  more  precisely,  “this”  is  
the   name   the   reader   would   use   to   refer   to   what   surrounds   him.   The  
movement  from  “Was  he  supposed  to  feel  that  way?”  to  “this  was  nothing  he  
                                                
3   It   is   worth   stressing   that   in   fiction,   the   very   notion   of   “reinstatement”   is   purely  
hypothetical  as  in  it  “there  is  no  direct  ‘original’  prior  to  or  behind  an  instance  of  ID  
[Indirect  Discourse]  or  FID;   the  supposedly   ‘derived’  utterances  are  not  versions  of  
anything,  but  themselves  the  ‘originals’  in  that  they  give  as  much  as  the  reader  will  
ever  learn  of  ‘what  was  really  said’”  [MCHALE  1978  :  256].  
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had   ever   worried   about”   announces   a   shift   of   perspective:   from   a   certain  
evaluative  distance  that  poses  the  issue  in  terms  of  somewhat  abstract  terms  
to   a   closer,   specific   and   specified   inner   dilemma.   The   demonstrative  
bespeaking   proximity—“this”—transforms   an   elsewhere   relating   to  
somebody   else’s   positioning—be   it   in   time   and   space   or   both—and   his  
perception  of  what  is  remote  and  what  is  close  at  hand,  into  an  object,  event,  
thought,   emotion   entering   our   “peripersonal   space”   [RIZZOLATTI   &  
SINIGAGLIA  2006].  The  peripersonal  as  opposed  to  the  extra-­‐‑personal  space  is  
the  area  surrounding  us  including  all  the  objects  we  can  reach  by  extending  
our   hands.   Our   bodies   are   the  measure  which   allow   us   to   build   the   very  
notion   of   space   and   the   interrelated   concept   of   intimacy   (or   lack   of).   As  
Rizzolatti  and  Sinigaglia  demonstrate,  the  activation  of  certain  neurons  (F4-­‐‑
VIP)   “does   not   simply   signal   the   position   of   the   stimulus  within   a   purely  
visual   area   […]   but   reflects   the   evocation   of   a   potential   motor   activity  
directed   toward   that   stimulus   capable   of   localizing   it   as   a   possible   action  
independently   from   its   actual   performance”   [RIZZOLATTI   &   SINIGAGLIA  
2006  :   65,   emphasis   in   original,   my   translation].   This   means   that   once   an  
object   enters—imaginatively   or   actually—our   peripersonal   space,   our  
immediate,  embodied  comprehension  of  the  emotional  state  of  someone  else  
is  triggered.  A  sharing  at  the  visceral-­‐‑motor  level  is  the  necessary  condition  
for   our   empathetic   involvement.   Once   the   readers’   first-­‐‑person   singular   is  
implicated,   it   becomes  possible   for   them   to   imagine   from  within—in  other  
words,   to   shift   from   a   cognitive   to   an   emotional   response.   The   interior  
monologue   that   the   passage   we   started   with   presents,   capitalizes   on   this  
response  thanks  to  the  employment  of  another  deictic  element:  the  personal  
pronoun   “you.”   The   spelling   out   of   the   second-­‐‑person   personal   pronoun  
works—at   least—   on   two   levels.   On   the   one   hand,   it   renders   the   Swede’s  
interior   reasoning   audible,   indicating   its   haunting   quality:   the   protagonist  
somehow   doubles   his   own   self   to   objectify   and   thus   universalize   his  
“natural”—which   here   functions   as   a   synonym   for   “normal”—take   on  
things.4  On  the  other  hand,  it  automatically  evokes  the  presence  of  the  first-­‐‑
person  singular  pronoun  which   thus  comes  out   from   its  hiding  behind   the  
third-­‐‑person  “he.”  The  common  result  is  implicating  the  reader  in  positions  
easier  to  inhabit—I  take  easiness  to  be  conjugated  in  terms  of  relevance  and  
availability  to  our  peripersonal  space,  both  physically  and  metaphorically.  
One  could  actually  argue  that  reading  the  passage  above  does  not  work  as  I  
maintain,  that  there  is  nothing  special  in  that  “this”  and  that  the  “you”  does  
not  trigger  any  particular  involvement  as  I  claim  it  should.  I  would  certainly  
                                                
4   It   is  needless   to   stress   the   fact   that,   thematically   speaking,   this   is  one  of   the  main  
trajectories  of  the  protagonist’s  coping  with  what  has  happened.  
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agree  that  the  passage  I  chose  does  not  strike  in  itself  any  exceptional  note,  
which,  on  its  own,  is  capable  of  causing  the  emotional  attunement  I  speak  of.  
I   would   nonetheless   claim   that   this   first   figural   scene   inaugurates   a  
vocabulary—typical   of   narrative   situations   predicated   upon   restricted  
focalization—that  causes   the  desired  effect  cumulatively.  Starting  from  here,  
in  fact,  the  reader  is  repeatedly  presented  with  a  deictic  field—invariably  the  
same,   page   after   page—that   gradually   erodes   the   very   possibility   of   a  
detached   perspective.   In   this   respect,   the   reader   becomes   mesmerized   as  
Zuckerman   himself   has   previously   been   mesmerized.   Deictics   work   their  
way  into  the  reader’s  embodied  experience  as  they  are  the  skeleton  around  
which   the   Swede’s   existential   situation   is   presented   and   becomes  
imaginatively  reproducible––not  in  abstract,  but  in  experiential  terms.  
Let  us  consider  another  example:    
Oh,  the  pitying  way  he  is  looking  at  me  and  my  pathetic  explanation.  
Superior   bastard.   Cold,   heartless   bastard.   Stupid   bastard.   That’s   the  
worst  of  it—the  stupidity.  And  all  of  it  is  because  he  looks  the  way  he  
looks   and   I   look   the  way   I   look   and  Dawn   looks   the  way   she   looks  
and  …  [ROTH  1997  :  97,  emphasis  in  original]  
Merry’s   speech   therapist   is   the   target   of   the   Swede’s   angered   thoughts.  A  
page   earlier,   the   very   same   tonality   associated   with   the   first-­‐‑person  
pronoun—“he   hates   me”—was   presented   by   Zuckerman   with   the  
explanatory,  reader-­‐‑friendly,  typically  narratorial,  “thought  the  Swede”  [96].  
In  the  passage  just  quoted,  the  shift  to  the  “I”  is  unfiltered  by  the  narrator’s  
intervention  and   thus   it   reaches   the   reader   in   all   its   raw   immediacy.  From  
this   moment   on,   the   pronoun   “I”   surfaces   over   and   over   again,   at   times  
suddenly  and  unexpectedly,5  at  times  as  the  emotionally  logical  outcome  of  
a  deeper  immersion  in  the  Swede’s  interiority,  as  is  the  case  with  the  almost  
three-­‐‑page-­‐‑long   textual   portion   in   which   the   Swede   reminisces   about   the  
significance  being  a  Marine  had  for  him.  The  long  stretch  in  the  first-­‐‑person  
singular   about  Marines,   America,   and   the   Swede’s   love   for   the   former   as  
representing  quintessentially  the  latter  ends  as  follows:  
Got  to  marry  a  beautiful  girl  named  Dwyer.  Got  to  run  a  business  my  
father   built,   a  man  whose   own   father   couldn’t   speak  English.  Got   to  
live  in  the  prettiest  spot  in  the  world.  Hate  America?  Why,  he  lived  in  
                                                
5  “All  she  had  to  do  was  wait.  If  only  she  could  have  waited.  That  was  Merry’s  story  
in   a   nutshell.   She   was   impatient.   She   was   always   impatient.   Maybe   it   was   the  
stuttering   that   made   her   impatient,   I   don’t   know.   But   whatever   it   was   she   was  
passionate   about,   she   was   passionate   for   a   year   […]”   [ROTH   1997:   160,   emphasis  
mine].    
Pia Masiero / 140 
 
 
America  as  he  lived  in  his  own  skin.  All  the  pleasures,  all  the  success  
and   happiness   had   been   American   […].   Yes,   everything   that   gave  
meaning   to   his   accomplishments   had   been   American.   Everything   he  
loved  was  here.  [213]  
Here   we   are   facing   again   the   interplay   between   the   dual-­‐‑voiced   tonality  
typical   of   figural   situations:   the   reader’s   almost   overhearing   the   Swede’s  
talking   to   himself   and   the   narrator’s   comments   that   position   his   hero’s  
feelings   on   a   wider—both   historical   and   cultural—arena.   The   two  
perspectives   merge   in   the   deictic   “here”   which   pertains   both   to   the  
narrator’s  and  the  character’s  world  (not  to  mention  the  further  possible  turn  
of   the   screw  crossing   the  diegetic  boundary   to   include   the  author,  himself,  
adumbrated   and   doubled   in   Zuckerman).   “Here,”   however,   belongs   in  
another   dimension,   the   reader’s,   in   which   it   simply   names   where   the  
reader’s  body  is.    
Let  us  take  a  step  back.  One  of  the  most  obvious  naturalizing  moves  a  reader  
automatically  makes  when  he  reads  is  postulating  a  subjectivity.6  It  actually  
seems   that   this   positing   is   the   default   situation   the   reader’s   activity   of  
recreating   a   storyworld   hinges   upon;   if   so—and   I   think   this   indication  
captures  our  common  experience  as  readers—it  follows  that  we  need  to  give  
that  subjectivity  a  place  and  time  to  inhabit.  As  Csordas  deftly  summarizes:  
“the  very  possibility  of  individuation  […]  has  as  its  condition  of  possibility  a  
particular  mode  of  inhabiting  the  world  as  a  bodily  being”  [CSORDAS  1999  :  
144].  Along  these  same  lines,  we  may  say  that  the  readerly  re-­‐‑creation  of  the  
individual  that  we  understand  as  possessing  a  body  (more  or   less)   like  our  
own   (read:   a   character)   is   all   the   more   successful   as   we   manage   to   gain  
access   to   the   very   same   existential   coordinates   representing   his/her  
particular,   that   is,   unique,  mode  of   inhabiting  his/her  world   (read:   fictional  
world).  The   transportation7   into   a   given   storyworld—my  argument  goes—
may   depend   heavily   on   deictics   that   provide   the   anchoring   for   this  
ascription,   which   is   a   consequence   of   our   own   experientially   embodied  
mode  of  understanding  and  coming  to  terms  with  reality.  The  deictic  center  
originating  in  the  “who,”  “where,”  and  “when”  concerning  the  Swede’s  life  
is  mirrored  in  the  deictic  center  revolving  around  the  “who,”  “where,”  and  
                                                
6   In   this   context,   naturalization   refers   to   the   default,   that   is   cognitively   automatic,  
ascription  of  an  appropriate  (read  natural)  context  to  a  given  utterance.  This  notion  is  
at   the   basis   of   Monica   Fludernik’s   rethinking   of   narratology   starting   from  
conversational   storytelling   and   experientiality   in   her   seminal   book   Towards   a  
‘Natural’  Narratology.    
7  “Transportation  can  be  thought  of  as  a  melding  of  an  integrative  attention,  imagery,  
and  emotion,  focused  on  story  events”  [MAZZOCCO  et  al.  2010:  361].  
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“when”   concerning   the   reader’s   life.   “The   reader’s   contribution   to  
understanding  the  narrative”  turns  thus  out  to  be  the  reader’s  providing  his  
own   embodied   self   as   the   stage   to   experience  what   (focalizing)   characters  
live  and  understand  [RAPAPORT  et  al.  1989  :  3].  
He   had   allowed   her   to   talk,   he   had   allowed   himself   to   listen,   only  
because  he  wanted   to  know;   if   something  had  gone  wrong,  of  course  
he  wanted  to  know.  What   is   the  grudge?  What   is   the  grievance?  That  
was  the  central  mystery:  how  did  Merry  get  to  be  who  she  is?  But  none  
of   this   explained   anything.   This   could   not   be  what   it   was   all   about.  
This  could  not  be  what  lay  behind  the  blowing  up  of  the  building.  […]  
This  whole  exchange  had  been  a  ridiculous  mistake.  To  expect  this  kid  
to   talk   to  him   truthfully.   […]  Here  was   the  hater—this   insurrectionist  
child!  [ROTH  1997  :  138,  emphasis  in  original]  
This  passage  presents,   together  with   the   ingredients  we  have   already  met,  
“this”   and   “here”—whose   repeated   appearance   guarantees   the   cumulative  
effect   I   have   spoken   of   earlier—a   further   element  which   goes   in   the   same  
direction:   the   shift   to   the   present   tense.   This   change   in   verbal   tense   is  
certainly   not   a   deictic;   it,   however,   contains   an   intrinsic   one—“now.”   As  
with   the  other  deictics,   the  potentiality   for   empathetic   involvement   is  very  
high   in   this   case   too,   as   the   present   tense—that   is,   the   “now”—is   the  
temporal  counterpart  of  the  “here”:  both  spell  out  the  existential  coordinates  
of  the  reader’s  embodied  presence  in  the  world.  
How   could   he   bring   Dawn   here?   Driving   Dawn   down   McCarter  
Highway,   turning   off  McCarter   and   into   this   street,   the  warehouses,  
the   rubble,   the   garbage,   the   debris   […]   Dawn   seeing   this   room,   her  
hands   touching   the  walls   of   this   room,   let   alone   the  unwashed   flesh,  
the  brutally  cropped,  bedraggled  hair  […]  [239]  
He  had  done   it  by  kissing  her.  But   that  couldn’t  be.  None  of   this  could  
possibly  be.  Yet  it  was.  Here  we  are.  Here  she   is,   imprisoned  in  this  rat  
hole  with  these  “vows.”  [241,  emphasis  in  original]  
So   this  was  why   she  was   always   losing  her  patience  with  Orcutt—to  
put  me  off  the  track!  [335,  emphasis  in  original]  
Tonight  the  imagining  would  not  let  him  be.  [359]  
Yes,  the  breach  had  been  pounded  in  their  fortification,  even  out  here  
in   secure  Rimrock,   and  now   that   it  was   open   it  would  not   be   closed  
again.  They  will  never  recover.  Everything  is  against  them,  everything  
that  does  not  like  their  life.  [423]  
These  excerpts  present  some  more  examples   taken  from  different  moments  
in  the  development  of  the  story  American  Pastoral  tells:  they  are  some  of  the  
very  numerous   instances   in  which  we  zoom  in  on  the  Swede’s   thoughts  as  
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he  thinks  them.  It  may  actually  be  argued  that  this  is  the  very  narrative  stuff  
the  whole  book  is  made  of.  The  incessant  focus  on  the  Swede  while  he  copes  
with  Rita,  with  newly-­‐‑found  Merry,  with  his  family  and  friends  during  the  
dinner   on   1   September   1973,   gives   the   book   its   typical   claustrophobic  
quality.  This  is  an  obvious  consequence  of  the  massive  employment  of  Free  
Indirect   Discourse   and   quoted-­‐‑monologue   structuring   Zuckerman’s  
(imaginative)   reconstruction   of   the   self-­‐‑absorption   that   has   devastated   the  
Swede’s   life   ever   since   the   bombing   of   the   local   postal   office   up   to   1  
September   1973.   And   yet,   it   must   be   noted   that   not   all   the   instances   of  
“now”   instead  of  “then,”  “this”   instead  of  “that,”   the  present   tense   instead  
of   the   past   tense,   the   first-­‐‑person   instead   of   the   third   person,   here   and   in  
many   other   passages   of   the   book,   are   strictly   required   by   FID   or   quoted-­‐‑
monologue.   We   should   not   forget   that   the   story   is   governed   by  
retrospection,   and   thus,   inherently   by   the   past   tense:   as   such   it   typically  
revolves  around  a  spatial—to  be  associated  with  temporal—elsewhere.    
The   point   I   am   here   trying   to   make   is   that  American   Pastoral   succeeds   at  
involving  readers  because  it  is  built  on  the  linguistic  blocks  which  allow  an  
automatic,   immediate,   embodied   experience   of   a   given   moment—   these  
linguistic   blocs   are   the   deictics   “here,”   “now,”   “this,”   “I.”   The   Swede’s  
existential   situation   begins   to   feel  more   real   for   the   reader   because   of   the  
massive  employment  of  these  blocs.  If,  as  Gallese  suggests,  “the  body  is  the  
main   source   of   semantic   content,”   the   spatio-­‐‑temporal   coordinates   which  
permit  the  imaginative  leap  are  the  only  ones  our  bodies  directly  experience  
[GALLESE  2006  :  54].  Our  bodies  are  in  the  present  tense,  in  the  here  and  now  
of   the  space   they  occupy,   rooted   in   the  restricted  perception  of  our   limited  
first-­‐‑person   singular.   The   past,   the   future,   the   elsewhere,   are   cognitively  
filtered   and   thus   displaced   states   which   require   an   intellectual  
intermediation,   an   abstraction.   American   Pastoral   turns   its   readers   into  
resonating   chambers—the   chambers   being   their   own   bodies   which   are  
emotionally  (that  is  physiologically)  set  into  motion  by  seeing  imaginatively  
what   the   Swede   goes   through   in   the   very   moment   he   does   it.   And   once  
readers  become  aware  of   the   continual  presence  of   the  writer  himself  who  
has   become   a   resonating   chamber/body   in   the   first   place,   they   may  
experience   the   inebriating   condition   of   the   impersonating   writer   himself,  
who   cannot   but   write   in   the   here   and   now   of   writing,   who   cannot   but  
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